Most investors obsess over price-to-earnings ratios. Buffett built his fortune ignoring them.
The Owner Earnings Framework
Buffett's 1986 letter defined owner earnings as "reported earnings plus depreciation, depletion, amortization, and certain other non-cash charges... less the average annual amount of capitalized expenditures." This explains why he bought KO in 1988 at 15x P/E (seemingly expensive) — its capex was just 3% of revenue versus 8-12% for peers. Today, KO still generates ~$9B annually in owner earnings.
Portfolio Proof: The Data Behind the Philosophy
| Ticker |
P/E |
Owner Earnings Yield |
ROIC |
Buffett's Entry Year |
| AAPL |
~28 |
~5.2% |
~30% |
2016 |
| BAC |
~11 |
~8.1% |
~10% |
2011 |
| KO |
~24 |
~4.8% |
~15% |
1988 |
| AXP |
~18 |
~6.3% |
~12% |
1964 |
| OXY |
~12 |
~9.4% |
~8% |
2019 |
Notice the pattern? None were "cheap" on P/E at purchase. AAPL's owner earnings have compounded at ~18% annually since his investment, turning $36B into ~$160B despite its "high" multiple.
The 2008 Case Study: Why Cash is a Position
During the financial crisis, Buffett deployed $25B when others were paralyzed — $5B in GS preferred stock (10% dividend) and $6.5B for WFC warrants. Both deals demanded >20% annualized returns with downside protection. As he wrote in 2009: "When it's raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble." Critics note this approach missed the SaaS boom (CRM, NOW), but his framework intentionally excludes what he can't value.
What Buffett Would Buy Today
His recent moves suggest:
- Energy transition plays (OXY stake now ~25%)
- Capital-light insurers (BRK.B's float grew to $165B)
- Companies repurchasing shares at >10% discounts to intrinsic value (AAPL bought back $550B since 2012)
The risk? This ignores AI disruptors like NVDA — but as he quipped in 1999: "I don't invest in businesses I don't understand."
Ready to analyze these stocks? Search any ticker on MainRatios to see valuations from 6 legendary investors — free.